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legislation as is found in the majority opinion. If the legislative body intends that an employee, in the position of the
plaintiff here, may be removed from his position, it is its sole
prerogative to say so. It is not the function of this court
to determine that the charter provision, so obviously meant
to provide for the discharge of an employee guilty of misconduct, applies to one suffering from a physical disability.
If, as I am convinced it does, the charter makes no provision
for the removal of a person in the category in which plaintiff finds himself, undoubtedly the situation could be remedied
by the pr·oper authorities in a very short period of time. It
is not the duty of this court to supply the missing links in
the legislative chain.
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment with directions
to the trial court to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff
directing his restoration to his position in the Department of
Fire of the City of Los Angeles without loss of pay.
Shenk, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied March 31,
1952. Shenk, J., and Carter, J., were of the opinion that the
petition should be granted.

[L. A. No. 21820. In Bank. Mar. 3, 1952.]

CITY OF VERNON et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR
COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY et al., Respondents.
[1] Injunctions- Violation- Certainty.- Petitioners cannot be
guilty of contempt if the injunction which they violated is so
uncertain that they could not determine what it required them
to do.
[2] Id.-Judgment.-In California resort may be had to the findings of fact and conclusions of law to clarify any uncertainty
or ambiguity in an injunction.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Injunctions, § 78; Am.Jur., Injunctions, § 334.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Injunctions, §91; [2,3,5] Injunctions, § 74; [4] Injunctions, § 109(2); [6, 7] Contempt, § 42; [8]
Contempt, §55; [9, 11] Contempt, §56; [10] Contempt, § 80;
[12,13] Contempt, §32; [14] Injunctions, §90.5; [15] Contempt,
§ 68.
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[3] Id.-Judgment-Certainty.-An injunction requiring the city
of Vernon and members of the city council to arrange for
payment of the city's "proportionate share" of the cost of a
new sewage disposal plant "according to the gallonage allotted
to said corporation" and have such undetermined sums "available as required," is not uncertain where the findings set forth
a definite formula for computation of this share of the cost
and, together with the pleadings, make it clear that the money
is to be paid to the city of Los Angeles, the builder of the
new facilities.
[ 4] I d.- Appeal- Supersedeas-Mandatory Injunctions.-Provisions of a mandatory injunction are stayed by an appeal.
[5] Id.-Judgment.-Under an injunction requiring the city of
Vernon to make certain financial arrangements "within ninety
days after the entry of this decree," the 90 days commenced to run when the judgment, which was stayed by an
appeal, became final after disposition of the appeal.
[6] Contempt-Affidavit.-An affidavit charging contempt by a
city and members of the city council for failure to comply
with an injunction requiring them to make certain financial
arrangements within a prescribed time after entry of the
decree sufiiciently shows their personal knowledge of final
disposition of proceedings to review the decree by its averments that, after the decree became final, they took certain
steps in attempted compliance with certain provisions thereof.
[7] Id.-Affidavit.-An affidavit charging contempt by a city and
members of its council for failure to comply with an injunction requiring them to make certain financial arrangements
within a prescribed time need not allege that they intended
to violate the injunction; it is sufficient if it appears from
the affidavit that the citees, with knowledge of the injunction
and with ability to comply, did not obey it.
[8] Id.-Evidence.-Case against persons cited for contempt is
not required to be proved by the person who made the
affidavit of contempt, rather than by the testimony of other
witnesses and by documentary evidence.
[9] Id.-Evidence.-In a contempt proceeding there was sufficient
evidence that petitioners, a city and four members of its
council, had knowledge of the terms of a mandatory injunction which they failed to obey where three of the petitioners
were members of the council when the injunction decree was
rendered, and thereafter, an attorney representing the city
and council appeared before the council, "gave a report on
the matter and advised them that an appeal should be taken,"

[6] See Cal.Jur., Contempt, § 38; Am.Jur., Contempt, § 68.
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which was done, and the court was justified in inferring that
the fourth council member, who became such after the decree
was entered, learned of the existence of the judgment in the
due performance of his duties.
[10] !d.-Certiorari-Scope of Review.-In a proceeding to review
a judgment finding the accused guilty of contempt, the reviewing court will not construe the evidence in favor of the
accused as this would violate the rule that review of the
evidence is limited to determining whether there was any
substantial evidence before the trial court to sustain its jurisdiction.
[11] !d.-Evidence.-Where a city and the members of its council had knowledge of the terms of an injunction requiring them
to pay the proportionate cost of a sewage disposal plant, and
had ability to comply therewith but did not do so, it could
reasonably be inferred that their action was intentional despite express disclaimers of contemptuous intent.
[12] !d.-Defenses-Disclaimer of Intent.-Disclaimer of an intent
to commit contempt is no defense where a contempt clearly
appears from the circumstances constituting the act.
[13] !d.-Defenses-Disclaimer of Intent.-One cannot justify
disobedience of an order of court on the ground that it was
based on the advice of counsel; neither can such disobedience
be excused by the fact that it was in good faith and under
a mistake as to the law.
[14] Injunctions-Performance and Enforcement of.-Where an
injunction requires the city of Vernon and members of the
city council to arrange for payment of the city's "proportionate share" of the cost of a new sewage disposal plant
built by the city of Los Angeles, the institution of further
litigation on old eontracts allegedly made by Los Angeles to
dispose of Vernon's sewage is not compliance with the injunction, and such litigation remains open for determination
on its merits, unaffected by the injunction decree.
[15] Contempt-Imprisonment Until Performance of Act.-While
most omissions which are contempts cannot be corrected while
the contemnor is in jail, if he indicates his willingness in
good faith to perform, he would be entitled, and will be allowed,
to leave the jail in order to do so.

PROCEEDING to review a judgment of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County holding petitioners in contempt of
court. Joseph W. Vickers, Judge. Affirmed.
[12] See Cal.Jur., Contempt, § 45; Am.Jur., Contempt, § 73.

512

CITY OF VERNON

v.

SuPERIOR CouRT

[38 C.2d

Carson B. Hubbard, City Attorney, Edward R Young,
John F. O'Hara and John \V. Shenk. III, for Petitioners.
Fred N. Howser and Edmund G. Brown, Attorneys General,
and Bayard Rhone, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondents.
SCHAUER, J.-The city of Vernon and the five members
of its city council were found guilty of contempt for failing
to obey a mandatory injunction. The petitioners here include
the city and four members of the council. 'l'he trial court
ordered that each petitioner pay a fine, that the individual
petitioners be confined in the Los Angeles county jail for a
period of five days, and that the individual petitioners be
detained in jail until they, as members of the city council,
complete all arrangements for financing Vernon's share of
the cost of a sewage disposal plant as hereinafter described.
In this proceeding the petitioners seek certiorari to annul the
judgment of contempt. Their contentions are directed not
only at the validity of the contempt proceeding but also at
the injunction decree, which has long since become final. We
have concluded that the judgment of contempt should be
affirmed.
For many years Vernon and others, pursuant to contracts
with the city of Los Angeles, disposed of their sewage through
the Los Angeles sewer system, which emptied into Santa
Monica Bay. Thus there was created and maintained a public
nuisance so noisome and notorious as to finally (December 13,
1943) provoke the State of California into bringing the abatement action which forms the basis for this proceeding. By
such action the People of the State of California sought to
restrain the municipal and public corporations which used the
Los Angeles sewer system, and their officers and employes,
from discharging sewage into Santa Monica Bay without a
permit and to abate the public nuisance which resulted from.
their sewage disposal. Judgment for plaintiff was entered on
February 1, 1946, and affirmed (People v. City of Los Angeles
(1948), 83 Cal.App.2d 627 [189 P.2d 489]); this court denied
hearing; and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari (335 U.S. 852 [69 S.Ct. 80, 93 L.Ed. 400]).
The judgment in material part required that Los Angeles
build a sewage treatment plant of sufficient capacity to abate
the nuisance; that each corporate defendant either should
provide its own facilities for disposing of its sewage in a safe
and sanitary manner or should "within ninety days after the
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entry of this decree have . . . completed all arrangements
necessary for the :financing of its proportionate share of said
new treatment plant . . . [to be built by Los Angeles] according to the gallonage allotted to said corporation, so that
said share will be available as required'' ; each corporate
defendant which elected to use the Los Angeles sewage system
was ordered to report to the superior court, on or before
April 29, 1946, the arrangements which it made to pay for
its share of the plant ; the superior court retained jurisdiction
to inake further orders to carry its decree into full effect.
Those are the material terms of the decree which has become
final.
The affidavit by which this contempt proceeding was instituted contains the following averments: Vernon elected to
use the Los Angeles sewage system. After the denial of
certiorari, the trial court ordered the corporate defendants,
which had so elected, to report to it on or before August
29, 1949, what they had done to comply with the portion
of the judgment requiring them to arrange to :finance their
share of the cost of the plant. Vernon, instead of reporting
its arrangements, reported its reasons for not having complied
with that portion of the judgment. Each member of the city
eouncil of Vernon has personal knowledge of the terms of
the judg·ment. Neither Vernon nor the council has taken any
steps to provide the money necessary to pay Vern on's share
of the cost of such plant, although they have the ability to do so.

Certainty of Injunction
[1] Petitioners cannot be guilty of contempt if the injunction which they violated is so uncertain that they could
not determine what it required them to do. (Weber v. Superior
Court (1945), 26 Cal.2d144, 148 [156 P.2d 923].) Petitioners
have been found guilty of violating those provisions of the
injunction which required them to arrange for payment of
Vern on's "proportionate share" of the cost of the plant "according to the gallonage allotted to said corporation'' and
have such undetermined (but ascertainable) sums ''available
as required.'' They contend that the judgment is fatally
uncertain beeause it does not determine the amount or fractional interest which constitutes Vernon's "proportionate
share'' or what the cost of the plant will be or how much
''gallonage'' has been allotted to Vernon or to whom or how
38 C.2d-17
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or when the undetermined sum shall be ''available as required.''
[2] In California "resort may be had to the findings of
fact and conclusions of law to clarify any uncertainty or
ambiguity" in an injunction. (Gelfand v. O'Haver (1948),
33 Cal.2d 218, 222 [200 P.2d 790] ; see, also, Ophir Creek
Water Co. v. Ophir Hill Consol. Min. Co. (1923), 61 Utah
551 [216 P. 490, 492], where the court said, "In arriving
(at a correct interpretation of the decree and its meaning
\and effect it is incumbent upon the court to consider not only
\the language of the decree . . . but also the purpose and
/object of the litigation which terminated in the decree"; a
'judgment of contempt for violation of the disputed terms of
the decree was upheld.)
[3] If petitioners will consider the 1946 injunction in the
light of the findings of fact and conclusions of law and ''the
purpose and object of the litigation which terminated in the
decree,'' as made evident by the pleadings, they will be able
to comply with it. The findings give a definite formula for
computation of Vern on's share of the cost; they make it clear
that this share is to be paid to Los Angeles; and if Vernon
had desired to comply with the decree it could have ascertained the precise amount to be paid at any fixed time by consultation with Los Angeles and, if necessary, under court
supervisiOn. As already mentioned, the court had retained
jurisdiction to this very end. Other cities, parties to the same
basic litigation and subject to the same judgment, have been
able to understand and comply with its terms. Also, it is to
be remembered, Vern on voluntarily elected to accept these
terms of the decree, for abatement of its share of the nuisance,
rather than to adopt the alternative of providing its own
facilities for sewage disposal. It is not reasonable to infer that
Vernon made such election without knowing what it was
undertaking. Vernon's share of the cost of the plant based
upon estimates known to it at the time of the entry of the
decree would have been $901,250. Vernon made no attempt
to raise or appropriate this or any other sum. From time
to time the estimated cost of the plant increased, but Vern on
made no effort to compute or raise its share of the increased
cost.
In October, 1949, Los Angeles demanded $1,814,952.60 as
Vernon's share; petitioners by resolution took the position
that the 1946 judgment "now requires the payment by The
City of Vernon of $901,250.00, and . . . gives no legal basis
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for the demand of or the payment of $1,814,952.60" and that
Los Angeles purportedly allotted to Vernon "10,129,968
gallons per day instead of 10,300,000 gallons per day as
allotted by said judgment." It thus appears that in October,
1949, petitioners recognized tbat the 1946 judgment required
them to raise money to be paid to Los Angeles but took the
erroneous position that a liquidated, rather than a to-becalculated, amount to be raised and paid was fixed by that
judgment. Their present claim that they do not know to
whom the money should be paid does not appear to be advanced in good faith. Indeed, as will hereafter appear, their
chief objection to the injunction appears to be not so much
that it is uncertain but that notwithstanding the finality of
the judgment, it is erroneous. The judgment, of course, makes
abatement of the nuisance an absolute requirement not dependent on the cost thereof.
Snjfie?.ency of Affidavit
Petitioners urge that the affidavit by which this proceeding
was begun is fatally defective because it does not allege the
elate when they should have complied with the January, 1946,
judgment. As stated, that judgment required that Vernon
make its financial arrangements "within ninety days after
the entry of this decree." [4] The mandatory provisions of
the judgment were stayed by the appeal (City of Pasadena v.
City of Alhambra (1946), 75 Cal.App.2d 91, 95 [170 P.2d
499]) and the District Court of Appeal further stayed enforcement of the judgment until final decision of the United
States Supreme Court on the petition for certiorari. Thus
the 90 days after entry of the decree had long since passed
when the judgment became final. The trial court did not
fix, and Vernon did not ask it to fix, a new date for performance.
[5] In the contempt proceeding the trial judge took the
position that the 90 days commenced to run when the judgment became final. This view is supported by Fenton v.
Farmers' & ll1e1·chants' Nat. Bank (1901), 27 Tex. Civ. App.
231 [65 S.W. 199, 201]. There a decree awarded land to
plaintiff on condition that it pay a certain sum "within 90
clays from the date of said decree"; the judgment was stayed
pending appeal. It 'Nas held that the 90-day period began
to run when the judgment became final after disposition of
the appeal. In accord are Southern Oil Co. v. Scales (1902,
Tex. Civ.App.), 69 S.W. 1033; N on·is v. Kelsey (1915), 60 Colo.
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297, 300 [152 P. 1167]; and Uthoff v. Thompson (1933), 176
La. 599 [146 So. 161, 165]. 'rhis position is fair to petitioners
and we are in accord with it.
Petitioners rely upon In re McDonald (1932), 217 Cal. 29,
31 [16 P.2d 995], for the proposition that the affidavit must
show that they had personal knowledge of the outcome of the
appeal and the petition for certiorari, and upon Phillips v.
Superior Court (1943), 22 Cal.2d 256, 258 [137 P.2d 838],
for the proposition that the fact that they were parties to those
proceedings does not charge them with knowledge of the outcome thereof. However, on the facts established here, those
cases clearly are not controlling. [6] The affidavit sufficiently
shows petitioners' personal knowledge of the final disposition
of the proceedings to review the injunction decree by its
averments that after that decree became final petitioners took
certain steps (the filing of an application1 for a permit to use
the new plant ·and the making of a report to the trial court
stating ''its reasons for not having complied with . . . [a
certain provision] of the judgment") in attempted compliance with certain provisions of the decree (not the provisions under consideration in this contempt proceeding).
(See Romine v. Cralle (1890), 83 Cal. 432, 437 [23 P. 525].)
[7] Petitioners attack the sufficiency of the affidavit on the
further ground that it does not allege that they intended to
violate the injunction. They rely on Hutton v. Superior Court
(1905), 147 Cal. 156, 160 [81 P. 409]. It is there said,
''Contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal in their nature,
and an intent to commit a forbidden act is as essential to guilt
as in the case of a criminal offense.'' This is not to say, as
petitioners seem to believe, that the affidavit must contain
the words ''intent to violate the terms of the injunction'';
it is sufficient if it appears from the affidavit, as it does here,
that the citees, with knowledge of the injunction and with
ability to comply, did not obey it. (See Hume v. Superior
Court (1941), 17 Cal.2d 506, 513 [110 P.2d 669]; Ex parte
Creely (1908), 8 Cal.App. 713, 719 [97 P. 766] .)

Sufficiency of the Evidence
[8] Petitioners urge that because John Leggett, who made
the affidavit of contempt, did not testify, the evidence is in1
As shown by the affidavit for contempt, the application was filed on
August 24, 1949 (after the judgment had become final) and such application avers that ''This application is made pursuant to the Order of
the Superior Court . . . contained in that certain Judgment,'' etc., the
judgment identified being the basic injunction decree herein concerned.
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sufficient to support the finding that they were in contempt.
They cite no authority and give no reason in support of their
claim that the case against them should be proved by the
affiant, rather than by the testimony of other witnesses and
by documentary evidence.
[9] Petitioners also contend that there is no evidence that
they had knowledge of the terms of the injunction. This
contention is wholly lacking in merit. In 1946, when the
judgment was rendered, three of the four individual petitioners were members of the Vern on city council. There is
evidence that after the judgment was rendered Mr. Young,
an attorney who represented the city and the council, appeared before the council, ''gave a report on the matter and
advised them that an appeal should be taken," and the council
authorized him to do so. The trial court was justified in
inferring that the three petitioners who were members of the
council in 1946 retained their knowledge of the existence of
the judgment until it became final and that petitioner R. J.
Furlong, who became a councilman in 1948 and has served
as such since then, learned of the existence of the judgment
in the due performance of his official duties. Also, as already
shown (see footnote 1, supra), an application indicating
knowledge of the terms of the judgment was filed with the
State Department of Public Health on August 24, 1949.
Likewise, the report to the superior court (filed on or about
August 26, 1949) stating reasons for not having complied
with the judgment indicates knowledge of its existence and
its terms. Although it is said in Groves v. Superior Court
(1944), 62 Cal.App.2d 559, 568 (145 P.2d 355], and in In re
Felthoven (1946), 75 Cal.App.2d 465, 470 (171 P.2d 47], that
''the evidence . . . [is] to be strictly construed in favor of
the accused,'' the annulment of the contempt orders in those
cases was not based on a view of the evidence least favorable
to upholding the order. [10] For a reviewing court to construe
the evidence in favor of accused would violate the rule that
''the review of the evidence is limited to determining whether
there was any substantial evidence before the trial court to
sustain its jurisdiction." (Bridges v. Superior Court (1939),
14 Cal.2d 464, 485 [94 P.2d 983), and cases there cited.) 2
Here, the evidence on any reasonable view amply sustains
all essential findings.
"The Bridges case was reversed on other grounds (314 U.S. 252 [62
S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192)).
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[11] Petitioners further assert that there is no evidence
that they intended to violate the injunction. Petitioners, with
knowledge of the terms of the injunction and ability to comply
therewith, did not do so ; it can be reasonably inferred that
their inaction was intentional, despite express disclaimers of
contemptuous intent. [12] "Disclaimer of an intent to commit contempt is no defense where a contempt clearly appears
from the circumstances constituting the act. [13] And one
cannot justify disobedience of an order of the court upon the
ground that it was based upon the advice of counsel; neither
can such disobedience be excused by the fact that it was in
good faith and under a mistake as to the law." (5 Cal.Jur.,
Contempt, § 45; see, also, HaverneyM· v. Superior Coud
(1890), 87 Cal. 267, 274 [25 P. 433, 10 L.R.A. 650].)
Asserted Compliance with the Injunction
Petitioners admit that they "have not exercised any
official powers to levy a tax or to incur a bonded indebtedness
or impose any . . . charges, to provide the means by which
said municipal corporation could or might raise . . . the
monies necessary for the payment of the city's alleged proportionate share of the cost of construction of the new treatment
plant so that its share would be available as required," but
they contend that they have taken other means to comply
with the injunction; namely, on advice of counsel, in 1949,
they brought an action against Los Angeles in which they
allege that in 1909 and 1938 Vern on made contracts with
Los Angeles whereby the latter agreed to dispose of Vernon's
sewage; Vernon claims rights to sewage disposal under these
contracts without payment of its share of the cost of the new
plant. 3
[14] It is manifest that the institution of further litigation is not compliance with the injunction. The issues raised
in the injunction proceeding have been litigated and finally
adjudicated. The obvious purpose of the injunction was to
get the nuisance promptly abated and to that end to get the
new plant built and paid for without the delay attendant
on independent or later ensuing litigation to determine the
validity and effect of the old contracts of Vern on and other
corporate defendants. As to these contracts the District Court
of Appeal said (p. 648 of 83 Cal.App.2d), "This is a proceeding initiated by the people of the State of California on
3

The very bringing of this action constitutes further evidence of
petitioners' knowledge of the injunction decree.
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behalf of the state itself . . . to abate a public nuisance.
Therefore, the court rightfully refrained from passing upon
any of the rights, obligations or liabilities affecting the various
defendants by reason of their contractual relations with each
other, and left those matters open for future adjudication in
a proper proceeding. Although the aforesaid contracts concerned the disposal of sewage, the court would not be justified
in this action to adjudicate the rights existing between the
various appellants by reason of their contracts one with the
other. Insofar as the judgment herein is concerned, if any
of the appellants have any rights against the city of Los
Angeles, or vice versa, by reason of any existing contract,
such rights have been preserved and may be enforced in a
proper action.''
This ruling preserves to petitioners all contractual rights
they may possess under the mentioned contracts but likewise
it requires them to settle or litigate those rights independently
of compliance with the injunction decree. Vernon's continued
reliance on its 1909 and 1938 contracts with Los Angeles is,
in effect, a refusal to abandon contentions which were made
and decided against it in the injunction suit. The judgment
in that suit and the decision of the District Court of Appeal,
which has become final, conclusively establish that the bringing of actions upon the old contracts with Los Angeles is
not compliance with the injunction and that such litigation
remains open for determination on its merits, unaffected by
the injunction decree. ( N orr1:s v. San Mateo County Tme Co.
(19fi1), 37 Cal.2d 269, 272 r231 P.2d 493].)
[15] The individual petitioners urge that so long as they
mig·ht be confined in the l10S Angeles county jail pursuant
to the contempt order they could not comply with the injunction because they could not meet as a city council in Vernon.
Respondent answers this contention adequately by pointing
ont that most omissions which are contempts cannot be corrected while the contemnor is in jail but that, if the contemnor
indicates his willingness in good faith to perform, he would
be entitled, and will be allowed, to leave the jail in order
to do so.
'rhe conduct of the petitioning councilmen which was found
contemptuous wa;;; not the conduct of private individuals
but that of pnblic officials protecting the interests of the
Pmnicipalitv which they were elected to serve, acting nnder
the advice of connsel; and since the making of the contempt
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order they have fully complied with the requirements of the
injunction. The argument is made on behalf of petitioners
that by reason of those facts the punishment of the individual
petitioners by fine and imprisonment is so extreme as to be
beyond the range of proper judicial discretion. Such argument, however, is not a proper one to address to this court
at this time. It includes facts not all of which were before
the trial court at the time of the proceedings under review.
Our power of review on the present record is limited, by
section 1074 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to a determination "whether the infer\?r tribunal . . . has regularly pursued the authority of such tribunal,'' and the reasonableness
of the punishment cannot be passed upon in these review proceedings (see In re Carboni (1941), 46 Cal.App.2d 605, 614
[116 P.2d 453]). The trial court, however, on its own motion
or on application by petitioners, may remit the unexecuted
provision of the judgment that petitioners personally be punished for contempt. The argument based on the mitigating
circumstances above mentioned may in all propriety be addressed to that court, and it is to be presumed that it will
take into consideration such mitigating circumstances and
make an order appropriate in the premises.
For the reasons above stated the judgment of contempt is
affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J. pro
tern., concurred.
EDMONDS, J.-I concur in the conclusion that, under
applicable principles, the petitioners were guilty of contempt.
I base this concurrence solely upon the ground that Vernon's
suit against the city of Los Angeles was not filed within the
time fixed by the injunction for complying with its provision.
The judgm1mt in the abatement action required each city
which did not provide its own sewage disposal facilities to
complete ''all arrangements necessary for the financing of its
proportionate share of said new treatment plant" within 90
days. Vernon took no steps within the required time to comply
with that order. However, prior to the commencement of the
contempt proceedings, it filed an action against the city of
Los Angeles seeking to avoid any liability for the cost of
the Hyperion plant or to recover such amounts as might be
due under existing contracts.
The injunction in no way restricts the ''arrangements''
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---------------------

which the city
make to meet its obligations. Any rights
it has in the contracts sued upon are assets. Certainly if its
position is upheld, it will be able to satisfy all demands
which may be made upon it for payment of its share of the
cost of the new treatment plant.
The course which Vernon took was open to it under the
injunction provisions. In affirming the judgment in the
abatement action, it was held: ''This is a proceeding initiated
by the people of the State of California on behalf of the
state itself, and on behalf of the State Department of Public
Health, as well as other state agencies, against all named
defendants, to abate a public nuisance. Therefore, the court
rightfully refrained from passing upon any of the rights,
obligations or liabilities affecting the various defendants by
reason of their contractual relations with each other, and
left those matters open for future adjudication in a proper
proceeding. Although the aforesaid contracts concerned the
disposal of sewage, the court would not be justified in this
action to adjudicate the rights existing between the various
appellants by reason of their contracts one with the other.
Insofar as the judgment herein is concerned, if any of the
appellants have any rights against the city of Los .Angele&, or
vice versa, by reason of any existing contract, such rights
have been preserved and may be enforced in a proper action.
All of appellants' property and rights were preserved to them
and the judgment in the instant action does not impair or
violate any of their constitutional rights." (People v. City
of Los Angeles, 83 Cal..App.2d 627, 648 [189 P.2d 489).)
This language is said to have required the city "to settle
or litigate those rights independently of compliance with the
injunction decree.'' Further, it is read as a determination of
the present controversy.
I do not so interpret the opinion. The clear import of the
decision of the District Coure of Appeal is that the abatement
action was not the proper proceeding in which to adjudicate
private rights. The contract rights of all parties were specifically preserved. The question as to whether there were
rjghts which would reduce or eliminate financial obligations
under the injunction was specifically left open. It is clear
that the only result of the abatement proceeding was to
determine the duties of the respective defendants in abating
the nuisance. Whether, as between each other, there existed
.,.;f)'hf,s to have one assume the resnonsibilities o.f another. was
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not determined. Clearly an action to secure judicial determination of these rights was a possible "arrangement" which
would comply with the injunction.
I, therefore, find no basis for holding that the petitioners
are continuing to violate the injunction. At most, there was
a mere technical violation of the court's decree by the failure
to sue within 90 days. There is no showing that, by the
delay of a few days, the petitioners in any way impeded or
subverted the ultimate purpose of the injunction. In a case
such as this, where it is claimed that public officials have
not performed their duties, sound public policy should require
a much greater flouting of the court's authority than the
technical violation of one phase of the involved and complicated order of this case.
In my opinion, onE!'claiming that a judgment of the kind
here involved has been disobeyed should be required to show
that the delay has in some way obstructed the fulfillment of
the purpose for which the judgment was rendered. In the
present case, the failure to comply with the court's order
within the specified time has not delayed the abatement of the
nuisance nor obstructed the carrying out of the court's purpose. This is an additional circumstance which the trial court
may well consider in determining whether the unexecuted
portion of the judgment should be remitted.
I would modify the judgment by striking therefrom the
order for the continuing imprisonment of petitioners C. W.
Trowbridge, C. H. Mailliard, Genevieve Anderson and R. J.
Furlong.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
In my opinion the judgment of contempt should be annulled
for two rea!'lons : ( 1) The insufficiency of the affidavit upon
which the order to show cause in re contempt was based;
and (2) the uncertainty and ambiguity of the injunction which
has allegedly been violated.

Insufficiency of the Affidavit
The affidavit of John T. Leggett, assistant sanitary engineer
of the Bureau of Sanitary Engineering of the State Department of Public Health of Los Angeles, does not allege the
date on which petitioners were required to comply with the
terms of the judgment of January, 1946. The judgment provides as follows : ''It is further Ordered, Adjudged And
Decreed that as to those corporate defendants who do not
adopt some method of disposing of sewage originating in the
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corporate limits of such defendants other than a new treatment works at Hyperion, that such defendant shall, within
ninety days after the entry of this decree, have filed an
application with the State Department of Public Health of the
State of California for a permit to discharge its sewage
through a proposed new treatment plant to be built at
Hyperion, and that such defendants shall have by said time
completed all arrangements necessary for the financing of
its proportionate share of said new treatment plant or works
according to the gallonage allotted to said corporation so that
said share will be available as required.'' The affidavit sets
forth a statement to the effect that an appeal was taken from
said judgment to the District Court of .Appeal, and was
affirmed on February 11, 1948; that petitioners sought certiorari in the United States Supreme Court which was denied
,in October, 1948, and "that the judgment of this Court is
now :final.'' There is no allegation that the 90-day period
commenced to run from any particular time, or that it has
now expired. In In re McDonald, 217 Cal. 29, 31 [16 P.2d
995], it was held that personal knowledge of the existence
and status of a decree must be alleged. The affidavit contains
an allegation that all ''of said persons named above has
personal knowledge of all the terms and provisions of said
judgment,'' but it was held by this court in Phillips v.
8nperior Cmt1·t, 22 Cal.2d 256 [137 P.2d 838], that an allegation that the citee had actual knowledge of a judgment in an
action to which he was a party is not sufficient to show that he
had knowledge that the judgment had been affirmed on appeal
and had become final.
Petitioners also contend, and, in my opinion with merit,
that the affidavit is insufficient because it did not allege (nor
was there testimony to the effect) that they intended to
violate the injunction relying on Hutton v. Superior Court,
147 Cal. 156, 160 [81 P. 409], wherein it was said: "Contempt
proceedings are quasi-criminal in their nature, and an intent
to commit a forbidden act is as essential to guilt as in the case
of a charge of a criminal offense." The majority answers this
contention by saying that it is sufficient if it appears from the
affidavit ''as it does here, that the citees, with knowledge of
the injunction and with ability to comply, did not obey it.''
The effect of the two errors is to allow a judgment of contempt
to rest upon two assumptions-that the petitioners had knowledge of the time the 90-day period commenced to run and
intended to violate the injunction. The majority bases its
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,>,finding of intention to violate the injunction on its assumption of petitioners' knowledge of the time within which the
90-day period was to run.
The California courts have held that reviewing courts are
to construe the af-fidavit in a contempt proceeding very strictly
in favor of the accused and that no intendments are indulged
in aid of its suf-ficiency (In re F'elthoven, 75 Cal.App.2d
465, 470 [171 P.2d 47] ; F'1·owley v. Superior Court, 158 Cal.
220, 224 [110 P. 817] .) In the Felthoven case it was said
that ''The af-fidavit, the order to show cause, the evidence and
the findings in a contempt of court proceeding are to be
strictly construed in favor of the accused, and the presumption
in favor of the regularity of the proceedings and the judgment does not apply in contempt matters.'' Yet the majority
here is assuming facts in order to fill the gaps in the af-fidavit
and thus uphold the judgment. Since a contempt proceeding
is "quasi-criminal" in nature (Hutton v. Superior Court,
147 Cal. 156 [81 P. 409]) this method of af-firmance can hardly
be said to be in accordance with recognized principles of due
process of law. Another inference drawn by the majority is
that R. J. Furlong, who did not become a councilman until
1948, knew of the course of the action because of his official
capacity. The original judgment was rendered in January,
1946, but Mr. Furlong is imprisoned because of an inference
which the majority says must have occurred because of his
position. In Lindsley v. Superior Court, 76 Cal.App. 419,
425 [245 P. 212], it was said that the af-fidavit must set forth
not merely the ultimate facts, but the facts themselves. This
would seem to be more than applicable here.

Insttfficiency of the Injunction
I have quoted the judgment in the first part of this dissent.
It makes no provision for the amount of money that these
petitioners shall make ''all arrangements necessary'' to raise,
and remains silent with respect to whom it shall be paid.
The majority opinion points out that resort may be had to the
findings of fact and conclusions of law to clarify any uncertainty or ambiguity in an injunction (Gelfand v. O'Haver,
33 Cal.2d 218, 222 [200 P>2c1 790]) and concludes that these
findings and conclusions, together with the pleadings, make
it clear that the money is to be paid to the city of Los Angeles,
that the findings set forth a definite formula for computation
of Vern on's share of the cost of the sewage disposal plant.
The findings and conclusions are not 1:ncluded in the record
before this court, and resort must be had to the case of People
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v.
of Los Angeles, 88 Cal.App.2d 627 [189 P.2d 489]
(affirming the judgment in the public nuisance action) where
they are partially set forth. It appears to me that the record
in th1:s case must speak for ·itself. If petitioners are to be found
guilty of contempt committed because of an alleged violation
of a judgment which, in order to be construed, must be interpreted in the light of the findings of fact and conclusions
of law which preceded it, it would appear to me that the
burden is being placed on petitioners to prove themselves not
guilty of the charges against them. This is contrary to settled
principles of law. Conceding that the majority is correct in
assuming that resort may be had to the findings of fact and
conclusions of law to explain the judgment, it does not follow
that this rule is applicable to a case such as this where the
findings and conclusions are not a part of the record in the
contempt proceeding. In fact, even though resort is had to
the decision of the District Court of Appeal on the appeal from
the judgment in which the injunction was granted, it is
impossible to determine therefrom what, specifically, defendants are required to do in order to comply with the injunction.
\Vhere in the judgment is to be found a statement of
Vernon's proportionate share, which is to be fixed according
''to the gallonage allotted to said corporation'' 1 In order
to determine what Vernon's share is, it is necessary, according
to the majority, for petitioners to go back to the findings of
fact and conclusions of law filed in the nuisance action and
use the formula there set forth. Even if this were possible,
I do not believe such a burden can lawfully be imposed upon
citees in a contempt action. But, assuming that such a burden
may be imposed, there is still no definite or ascertainable and
fixed amount which petitioners can be said to be required
to raise. In 1946, petitioners' share of the cost of the plant
"based upon estimates known to it at the time of the entry of
the decree would have been $901,250 . . . . In October, 1949,
Los Angeles demanded $1,814,952.60 as Vernon's share." It
appears that the original estimate of the total cost of the
project was to have been $21,000,000, but according to the
Leggett affidavit. such an amount has already been exceeded
although the plant was then only 50 per cent complete,
indicating a probable total cost of some $48,000,000 and, in
light of the change in economic conditions, a possible total
cost of many millions more. Petitioners are to be jailed and
fined £or failing to raise an indefinite and unascertained
amount of money to be available as required. I agree with
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petitioners who ask "available to whom, when and where, and
how much 1'' The majority admits that petitioners cannot be
guilty of contempt if the injunction which they violated is
so uncertain that they could not determine what it required
them to do. If petitioners are to be found guilty of contempt
because of a violation of the injunction, interpreted in the
light of the findings of fact, it appears to me that they may
only be held liable for Vernon's share of the estimated cost
of $21,000,000, because that is the estimate on which the
formula is based and which appears in People v. City of Los
Angeles, supra, 83 Cal.App.2d 627, at page 637. The record
does not show that any demand was made on them for any
sum approximating this amount.
If petitioners are to be held to a proportionate share of
the total cost of the plant which, at the time of the commencement of this proceeding, was only 50 per cent complete and
had already exceeded the total estimated amount, then this
action is premature. There is no possible way for petitioners
to know what Vern on's proportionate share will be when the
sewage plant is completed.
The majority opinion in this case is a typical illustration
of the saying that "hard cases make bad law." Because, as
a matter of public welfare, the sewage disposal plant is necessary, petitioners are to be imprisoned and fined for relying
on the law as set forth in the cases heretofore decided which
have held that the affidavit in a contempt action must set forth
the facts with particularity, and that the judgment allegedly
violated must be sufficiently certain so that it could be carried
into effect.
From the foregoing it appears that the majority ·opinion
violates recognized concepts of law applicable to contempt
proceedings in order to reach a result, the justness and soundness of which is, to say the least, questionable. I cannot,
therefore, subscribe to such holding and would annul the
order here under review.
The opinion was modified to read as above printed and
petitioners' application for a rehearing was denied April 2,
1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the application
should be granted.

